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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
SALT LAKE CITY, A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.
9347

vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant and. Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was commenced in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, for a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of
Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, relating to the withholding of state income t~xes from wages paid to etnployees
by employers.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 12, 1959, Chapter 11i ofthe Laws of Utah, 1959,
being entitled "An Act * * * Providing for the Deduction
and Withholding of Individual Income Tax from Wages Paid
by Employers to Resident Employees, and Providing for the
Reimbursement of Expenses in Inaugurating and Administering
the Withholding Provisions of This Act" became a law amending Section 59-14-71, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended
by Chapter 124 of the Laws of Utah, 1955. (Paragraph 3 of
appellant's complaint as admitted by paragraph 3 of respondent's Answer, R. 1-4, 9). (Emphasis added above). The
appellant is a municipal corporation of the State of Utah and,
as such, is an "employer" paying "wages" to "employees"
within the purview of said act, and is subject to the require·
ments contained therein. (Paragraphs 2 and 4 of appellant's
complaint as admitted by paragraphs 2 and 4 of respondent's
Answer, R. 1, 4, 9). Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959,
does not provide for ''reimbursement" to "employers" of
expenses in inaugurating . and administering the withholding
provisions of said act. (Paragraph 5 of appellant's complaint
as admitted by paragraph 5 of respondent's Answer, R. 4, 9).
The defendant is charged with the enforcement and administration of Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959. (Paragraph
7 of respondent's answer, R. 4, 9).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 23 OF THE CONSTITU2
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TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN THAT THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF SAID ACT IS NOT CLEARLY EXPRESSED
IN THE TITLE THEREOF.
POINT II
THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED UPON THE APPEL~
LANT AS AN "EMPLOYER" UNDER CHAPTER 111 OF
THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, TO COLLECT A,ND REMIT
STATE INCOME TAXES TO THE RESPONDENT WITHOUT COMPENSATION FOR ITS SERVICES CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS-OF LAW A·ND INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE.
POINT III
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22, OF THECONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF. UTAH FOR ITS FAILURE TO
SET FORTH THE STATUTE IT- AMENDS AT-LENGTH.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS.
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS TO APPELLANT.
3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 23 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN THAT THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF SAID ACT IS NOT CLEARLY EXPRESSED
IN THE TITLE THEREOF.
Article VI, Section 23 of the Utah Constitution provides
as follows:
"Except general appropriation bills, and bills for
the codification and general revision of laws, no bill
shall be passed containing more than one subject,
which shall be clearly expressed in its title." (Emphasis
added).
The title of Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959,
sets forth the subject matter of the act and states, among other
things, that the act provides "for the Reimbursement of Expenses in Inaugurating and Administering the Withholding
Provisions of This Act." Respondent admits that the act does
not provide for "reimbursement" to "employers" of expenses
in inaugurating and administering the withholding provisions
of the act. In fact the body of the act does not provide "reimbursement" to anyone for sums expended in effecting the withholding provisions of the act.
Respondent argues that the term "reimbursement" as used
in the title of the subject act necessarily refers to the expenses
incurred by it in carrying out the program of the withholding
tax provided by the statute. The fallacy in this argument lies
in its failure to recognize the basic difference between the terms
.4
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"reimbursement" and "appropriation." The only reference to
expenses involved in the administration .. of the withholding
provisions of Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, is contained in Section ( 5) of the act which. reads .as follows:
.. ( 5) For the necessary expenses of administering the
withholding provisions of this act to June 30, 1961,
including the use of necessary tabulating devices and
cards, auditing and clerical services, fprms, stationery,
stamps and printing, there is appropriated from the
Uniform Schol Fund to the tax commission, the sum
of $125,000.00 and to the :finance commission the sum
of $60,000.00." (Emphasis added).
There can be no' question that the Legislature intended
the above section of the act to appropriate funds to the various
state departments charged with the enforcement of the act
after its effective date, i.e., May 12, 1959. Thus the body of
the act clearly contemplated an "appropriation" for future
expenses, not a ·~reimbursement". for past expenses incurred
in inaugurating and administering the withholding provisions
of ·the act. Indeed, the respondent was without authority to
effectuate the provisions of such act until it had become law
upon ·the aforementioned date, and upon that date the Legislature provided the respondent with the necessary fnnds for
anticipated· future expenses in carrying out the· purposes of
the act. It is too clear for argument that Section 5 of the act
here involved constituted an "appropriation~· only for the
necessary expense of administering the act from its .. effective
date to June 30, 1961. The absence of any provision for "reimbursement" to employers for their expenses involved in
inaugurating and administering the withholding provisions
of the act renders it fatally defective.

5
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It has been held in many cases that the primary meaning
of the verb "reimburse" is to pay back; to make return or
restoration of an equivalent for something paid, expended,
or lost; to indemnify; to make whole. Woerz v. Schumaker,
161 N.Y. 530, 56 N.E. 72; Perkins v. Brown, 179 Wash. 597,
38 P.2d 253, 101 A.L.R. 275; See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition for additional cases so holding. Likewise the noun
"reimbursement" has been held to mean pay back, to make
restoration, to repay that expended. Los Angeles County v.
Frisbie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 122 P.2d 526. And it has been held
that "reimbursement" presupposes previous payment. Solimine
v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344, 348. See Words
and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for other cases similarly defining "reimbursement."
On the other hand the cases clearly define an "appropriation" as the setting apart from the public revenue of fl.
certain SUffl: of money for a specified object, in such a manner
that the executive officers of the government are authorized
to use that money, and no more, for that object, and for no
other. Hunt v. Callaghan, 32 Ariz. 235, 257 P. 648; State ex
rel. Murray v. Carter, 167 Okla. 473, 30 P.2d 700; Grable v.
Blackwood, 180 Ark. 311, 22 S.W.2d 41; See Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, for additional cases. It has also
been held that there is a distinction between an "appropriation" and the making of "expenditures"-the latter being the
act of expending, a laying out of money, or a disbursement,
while the former means to set apart for, or assign to a particular person or use in exclusion of all others. Suppiger v.
Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 91 P.2d 362.
Applying the rule that the ordinary meaning and under6
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standing of a word will be employed .in construing statutes,
it is clear that the legislature contemplated some form .of
refund or repayment for prior expenditures incurred in connection ·with the collection of income taxes withheld from
wages by reason of its use of the term "reimbursement" in the
title of the act. The only persons that could have been reasonably contemplated thereunder would be "employers" as defined
in the body of the act inasmuch as .they constituted the only
class of person~ under the act who were charged with affirmative duti~s necessitating the outlay of cash expenditures to
effectuC;lte the purposes of the act witJ;10ut provision for prior
paY:ment of such, expenses. The expenses of the respondent
and .the State Finance Commission were adequat~ly provided
for in advance by a specific appropriation contained in the act.
It necessarily follows, therefore, that the subject matter of
Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, was not clearly
expressed in its title as required by Article VI, Section 23 of
the Utah Constitution for two reasons:
1. The body of the act does not provide for "reimbursement" to employers for their expenses in inaugurafing and
administering the withholding provisions contained therein.

2. The title of the act contains no reference to an "appropriation" to defray the future expenses of the State Tax Commission in inaugurating and administering the withholding
provision of· the act, and the inclusion .of such an "appropriation" within the body of the -act is inconsistent with the title
thereof·
In the case of Pass v. Kanell et al., 98 U. 511, 100 P.2d
972, this court held that ·the title to an .act does not purport
7
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to state the details, but it must be broad enough to include
the subject of the legislation. In that case the majority opinion
held the statute contained subject matter not clearly expressed
in the title and stated as follows at page 975 of 100 P.2d:
"We fail to discover anything in the title 'Registration of Motor Vehicles' that would· justify the inclusion
of liability of owners of rent automobiles for negligence of the drivers of such rented automobiles."
In view of the holding in the Kanell case, appellant is
confident that this court will conclude that there is nothing
in the term "reimbursement" as used in the title of Chapter
111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, that would justify the inclusion
of an "appropriation" to the respondent for its future expenses
in carrying out assigned duties and obligations under the withholding provisions of said act.
In addition to the above objection to the title of Chapter
11 i of the Laws of Utah, 1959, the attention of this court is
directed to the limitation expressed in the title of said act to
"Resident Employees." An examination of the act itself, particularly Sections (1) (a) and (2) (b) thereof, reveals that
the body of the act covers all employees, not just resident employees. The sections referred to above read as follows:
" ( 1) (a) Commencing July 1, 1959, every employer
making payment of wages shall deduct and withhold
from wages an amount equal to seven per cent of the
total amount required to be deducted and withheld
by an employer. from wages of an employee under the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of the United
States. The amount of tax withheld shall be computed
8
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without regard to any other amount required to be
withheld thereunder."

"(2) (b) The term 'employee' means and includes
every individual performing services for an employer,
either within or without, or both within and without
the State of Utah, the performances of which services
constitutes, establishes and determines the relationship
between the parties as that of employer and employee,
and includes officers of corporations, individuals, including elected officials, performing services for the
United States Government or any agency or instrumentality thereof, or the state of Utah or any county,
city, municipality or political subdivision thereof."
This is a classic example of the failure of the title of an
act to clearly express the subject matter of the act itself. The
accepted, and indeed the required, practice in drafting legislation is to use language in titles which is broad enough to
cover the subject of the legislation, not to resort to language
which is more limited in scope than the body of the act. See
Pass v. Kanell, supra. Appellant would further point out that,
even if such act itself was only applicable to withholding of
income taxes from resident employees, it would fail for the
reason that such a classification would unconstitutionally discriminate against resident employees. There can be no doubt
that the use of the term "Resident Employees" in the title of
this act was the result of mistake or carelessness on the part
of those responsible for drafting the bill. Such mistake or
carelessness, however, cannot be the basis for breathing life
into an invalid act.
For the reasons above stated, Chapter 111 of the Laws
of Utah, 1959, fails to meet the requirements of Article VI,
Section 23 of the Utah Constitution.

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II
THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ,UPON THE APPELLANT AS AN "EMPLOYER" UNDER CHAPTER 111 OF
THE ~AWS OF UTA;E-f, 195~,TO.COLLECT AND REMIT
STATE INCOME TAXES TO THE RESPONDENT WITHOUT COMPENSATION FOR ITS SERVICES CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUt DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE.
•

I

•

•

To enforce collection of a tax impos~.d under ~n invalid
law is to take the property of the taxpayer without due process
o~ law. ]. & A. Freiberg Co. v. Dawso~) D.C. Ky:,· 274 F.
420, affirmed in Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Ware house
Co.J 41 S. Ct. 272, 255 U:S. 288, 65 L.Ed. 638. It would therefor.e follow that the ·enforced c~llection of state income t~~~s
by employers under the requirements of Chapter 111 of the
Laws of Utah, 1959, would likewise constitute. the taki~g of
such employers' property without due process of law co~trary
to the pr?visions of the st~te or federal .constitutions ~f s~ch
statute is invalid for any of the reasons asserted under Points
I and III herein.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the ·United States; in
the leading case of Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company} 240 U.S. 1, 60 L.Ed. 493, decided in 1915, although
holding that the ·due process clause of the 5th Amendment to
the Federal Constitution is not a limitation upon the taxing
power .conferred upon .Congress by the Constitution and that
.the duty cast upon corporations to collect an income tax. and
absorb the cost to which they are thereby subjected is not
10
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repugnant to due process of law as a taking of property without
compensation, also placed a limitation upon that ruling by
stating, at page 504 of 60 L.Ed.:
"And no change in the situation here would arise
even if it be conceded, as we think it must be, that this
doctrine would have no application in a case where,
although there was a seeming exercise of the taxing
power, the ar:t complained of was so arbitrary as to
constrain to the conclusion that it was not the exertion
of taxation, but a confiscation of property; that is, a
taking of the same in violation of the 5th Amendment;
* * *." (Emphasis added).
In view of the increased complexities of income tax withholding requirements and the extension of such withholding
provisions to cover virtually all wages paid by employers,
rather than a few isolated cases, it would appear that the time
has arrived for a re-evaluation of the confiscatory nature of
such tax programs. It is a matter of common knowledge that
the costs incidental to the employment of wage earners in
the form of frequent accountings to the federal and state
governments upon matters of such complexity as require the
employment of specially trained personnel for that purpose
is stifling the emergence of new small businesses which have
served historically as the cornerstone of our free enterprise
system. At the present time employers are being charged with
the direct responsibility of accounting to various governmental
agencies for a substantial portion of the wages paid to their
employees and the administrative costs incidental thereto have
steadily increased over the years without provision for compensation to such employers for their out of pocket expense
in securing to government its vital nourishment. It is the
11
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appellant's contention that the time is long overdue for our
courts to reconsider the inequality of withholding taxes. which
places upon the employer the unequal burden of sustaining
government and consequently results in the destruction of the
· most valuable irreplaceable natural resources ·of this country
-human initiative and creativeness.
·
There is no· concept more rooted in our ·constitutional
form of government than that which prohibits the exaction
of involun.t~ry servitude. See McGrew v. Industrial Comm. 1 96
U. 203, .85 P.2d 608. The imposition of costly requirements
that employers collect and remit to government the fruits of
.. taxation .from the wages of their employees without compensati~:m for such services clearly places the employer in a position
of involuntary servitude. To hold otherwise, as some cases have
done, place.s . the convenience of tax collection fqr the government above the freedom of the individual. In addition
employers are subjected to "double taxation" under such circumstances inasmuch as their ordinary tax burden is increased
by their collection and remittance costs solely by reaso~ of
their classification as an employer. Thus such costs, which
are not borne equally by thetaxpaying public, become a~ addit,iona.l tax burden upon employers incidental to. the imposition
. of a completely separate tax upon incomes inc~u~ng that of
. employers .
. For the reasons above stated the appellant, as an.. "employer" . pnder the income tax withholding law enacted by
Chapter lllof the Laws of Utah, .1959, herewith submits that
the enforcement .of said Act by the respondent against the
appellant is grossly unfair upon its face, deprives the appellant
of its property without due process of law and subjects it to

12
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a state of involuntary servitude. In this connection it is to be
noted that the legislature has provided reimbursement to the
respondent for its expenses in collecting and remitting local
sales taxes to municipalities, including the appellant, under
Section 11-9-7, U.C.A. 1953, as enacted by Chapter 114 of
the Laws of Utah, 1959.

POINT III
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22, OF THE C~NSTITU
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH FOR ITS FAILURE TO
SET FORTH THE STATUTE IT AMENDS AT LENGTH.
Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, providing for
withholding of income taxes on all incomes in Utah, was
passed by the Legislature on March 12, 1959. Chapter 112
of the Laws of Utah, 1959, relating to the withholding of
income taxes on non-resident employees, and providing for an
exemption for employers who do business in Utah less than
60 days in a calendar year, was passed by the Legislature on
February 25, 1959. Both acts, which were amendments to
Section 59-14-71, Utah Code Annotated,, 1953, as amended,
became effective upon May 12, 1959.
The pertinent section of Article VI, Section 22, of the
Utah Constitution provides as follows:

* * * and no law shall be revised or ,amended by
reference to its title only; but the act as revised, or
section as amended, shall be re-enacted and published
at length."
13
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Section 59-14-71, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
presently consists of '!- composite section born of the changes
included in both Chapters J 11 and 112 of the Laws of. Utah,
1959, in accordance with an Attorney General's opinion, No.
59029, dated March 26,. 1959. However, the changes incorporated in the then existing law by the. passage of Chapter
112 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, were not incorporated in
Chapter 111 of said Laws which was enacted subsequent to
said Chapter 112. The failure of the Legislature in enacting
Chapter 111 to set forth the amendments previously incorporated in said Section 59.:14-71 by the passage of Chapter
112 ·is clearly in violation of the above quoted constitutional
provision.·
In holding that the provisions of Article VI, Section 22
of the Utah Constitution are restrictive and mandatory- requiring an amended or revised section or act to be complete within
itself, so that when published as ·revised or amended it will·
contain all the law upon the subject embraced in the act- or
section; this court stated as follows in State v.- Beddo, 22 U.
432, 63 P. 96, at page 97 of the Pacific Reporter:
"This is a wise provision ~£ the constitution, and
was intended to avoid that confusion which would inevitably follow -if an act or section could be revised
or amended by mere reference to the title or section or
word or line as to which the change was intended to
be made; for, after repeated amendments so made, the
statute law would be rendered so ambiguous and imperfect, and in the course of time would require the
examination of so many enactments to ascertain what
statutes were in force, as to render any satisfactory
determination or conclusion exceedingly difficult, if
not impossible. Such revisions and amendments by
14
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mere reference to title, however, not only render the
statute law difficult of const~dion, but they are calculated to confuse and mislead the public, and are
therefore inimical to business transactions and · the
interests of the people. So they have a t~ndency to
encourage improvident legislation, by misleading the
average legislator, who, because of numerous additions, insertions, or substitutions, made with mere
reference to the old statute or section, is unable to
ascertain what the exact state of the law is; and yet
it is of the highest importance that every member of
the legislature shall have a correct understanding of
what the existing law is, before he attempts to revise
or amend it. This fact was doubtless recognized by
the framers of the constitution, who evidently intended
the provisions above quoted as a remedy for the evils
referred to. Therefore, when an act or a: section is revised or amended the same must be_ complete within
itself, so that when published as revised or amended
it will contain all the law upon the subject embraced
in the act or section; and any matter contained in the
old statute or section which is not contained in the
new ceases to have the force of law, except as to past
transactions." (Emphasis added).
An examination of Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah,
1959, and particularly a comparison of the same with present
Section 59-14-71, Utah Code Annotated 1953, will reveal most
conclusively that said Chapter 111, which was the last amendment to the above code section adopted by the Legislature, is
not complete within itself such that it contains all the law
upon the subject embraced in that section. In fact subsections
( 1) (b) and ( 6) thereof are not even included in said Chapter
111. It necessarily follows that Chapter 111 of the Laws of
Utah, 1959, violates Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
15
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POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS.
Appellant incorporates herein the arguments set forth
under Points- I, II, and III. If any or all of said points are
approved by this court it necessarily follows·· that the lower
court -erred in· granting respondent's motion for judgment on
the pleadings.

POINT V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS TO APPELLANT .
.AppeHant incorporates herein the argument set forth
under Points I, II and III, and for the reasons thereili set forth
urges this court to hold that the lower court erred_ in failing
to ,grant judgment on the pleadings to appellant as a matter
of law.

CONCLUSION
In view of the above facts and the law applicable thereto
the following conclusions are inescapable:
1. The failure of the legislature to provide for any "re-

imbursement" to employers for their expenses incurred in the
collection and remittance of income taxes withheld from employees' wages under Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959,
16
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is in direct conflict with the provisions of the title of said act
and therefore violates the constitutional prohibition against
the inclusion in legislation of subject matter which is not clearly
expressed in the title.
2. The limitation of the title of Chapter 111 of the Laws

of Utah, 1959, to provide only for the withholding of income
taxes from wages of "Resident Employees" thereunder is in
direct conflict with the body of the act which calls for withholding of income taxes from all wages of all employees and
therefore violates the constitutional prohibition against the
inclusion in legislation of subject matter which is not clearly
expressed in the title.
3. The failure of the legislature in amending Section 5914-71 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, by its passage of
Chapter 111 of the Laws of 1959, to include in said chapter
the amendments to said section 59-14-71 included in Chapter
112 of the Laws of 1959 which was passed by the Legislature
prior to said Chapter 111 constitutes a violation of the constitutional prohibition against statutory amendments which
fail to set forth the amended sections at length.
4. The requirement that appellant withhold and remit
state income taxes to the respondent under Chapter 111 of
the Laws of Utah, 1959, without compensation or reimbursement for its expenses necessarily incurred thereunder constitutes a taking of appellant's property without due process of
law and subjects appellant to involuntary servitude.
The appellant therefore asks this Honorable Court to
declare that Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, is void,
unconstitutional, ineffective, and without force of law; that
17
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the appellant is not required to further comply with the terms
and provisions of said Act; that the respondent, its agents and
employees be permanently restrained and enjoined by the
order of this court from exercising any of the powers, rights
or duties respecting the enforcement of said Act against the
appellant; and that appellant be granted its costs upon t~is
appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES L. BARKER,
City Attorney

JR.

JACK L. CRELLIN
Assistant City .Attorney
414 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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